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Abstract In this work, we focus on bicooperative games, a variation of the classic
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relation, balanced contributions, null player exclusion property and block property.
Moreover, a computational procedure to calculate bisemivalues in terms of the mul-
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1 Introduction
Cooperative games in a finite set of players are often defined in terms of a charac-
teristic function, which specifies the worth that each coalition can achieve for itself
independently of the remaining players. Each player has only two options: either to
join a coalition (in this case, he or she is supposed to cooperate in order to obtain the
maximum worth of the coalition) or to stay aside. However, there are many situations,
that cannot be described by using this classical model, that we will see in the final
section of the paper. Introduced in [1], bicooperative games are appropriate in this
kind of scenarios.
In these games, each player can participate positively to the game, negatively,
or do not participate. Formally, ordered pairs of disjoint coalitions of players have
to be considered. Thus, each such pair yields a partition of the set of players in three
groups: (i) players in the first coalition are defenders of modifying the actual situation
and they want to accept a proposal; (ii) players in the second coalition do not agree
with it and they will take actions against any change; and (iii) the remaining players
are not convinced of the profits of the change, but they do not have intention of
objecting to it.
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As in the cooperative case, different solution concepts have been introduced on
bicooperative games. In [2], the Shapley value for bicooperative games is introduced
and in [3], biprobabilistic values for bicooperative games were defined and charac-
terized. In [4], ternary bicooperative games, which are a refinement of the ternary
voting games introduced in [5], were analized and the Banzhaf power index was de-
fined and axiomatized for these games.
In a recent paper [6], bisemivalues on bicooperative games were introduced and
an interesting characterization of this kind of values by means of weighting coeffi-
cients was provided, in a similar way as given for semivalues on cooperative games.
Moreover, a subfamily of these values, called (p,q)–bisemivalues was also intro-
duced. The multilinear extension of a bicooperative game was also defined and, for
the particular case of the (p,q)–bisemivalues, a computational procedure in terms of
the multilinear extension of the game to calculate them, was also given.
The first part of the present paper focusses on studying the behavior of the bisemi-
values with respect to several standard properties considered for values on coopera-
tive games, concerning dominance, monotonicity, sensitivity, null and nonnull play-
ers, balanced contributions and block (see, e.g., [5,7,8]). The notions of regularity
and induced bisemivalue arise in a natural way as a convenient condition to guarantee
the validity of some of them. We then combine the notion of induced bisemivalue on
lower cardinalities with regularity and obtain a series of characteristic properties of
regular bisemivalues that concerns null and nonnull players, subgames and blocks.
The second part is devoted to give a computational procedure to compute bisemi-
values by means of the multilinear extension of the game, that parallels the method
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obtained in [9] to compute semivalues on cooperative games and expands the results
obtained in [6] for (p,q)–bisemivalues.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, a minimum of pre-
liminaries is provided. In Section 3, we introduce several properties for values on
bicooperative games and study the behavior of bisemivalues with respect to them.
Section 4 is devoted to give a procedure to compute bisemivalues. Section 5 contains
one example and finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cooperative Games and Semivalues
Let N be a finite set of players and 2N be the set of its coalitions (subsets of N). A
cooperative game on N is a function v : 2N → R, that assigns a real number v(S) to
each coalition S ⊆ N, with v( /0) = 0. We will denote by GN the set of all cooperative
games on N.
Following the axiomatic description given in [10], ψ : GN→RN is a semivalue iff
it satisfies the following properties: (i) linearity: ψ[v+v′] = ψ[v]+ψ[v′] and ψ[λv] =
λψ[v] for all v,v′ ∈GN and λ ∈R; (ii) anonymity: ψθi[θv] = ψi[v] for all permutations
θ on N, i ∈ N, and v ∈ GN ; (iii) positivity: if v is monotonic, then ψ[v] ≥ 0 and (iv)
dummy player property: if i ∈ N is a dummy in game v, then ψi[v] = v({i}).
In [11], there is an interesting characterization of semivalues by means of weight-
ing coefficients. Set n = |N|. Then: (a) for every weighting vector {pk}n−1k=0 such that








= 1 and pk ≥ 0 for all k, the expression
ψi[v] = ∑
S⊆N\{i}
ps[v(S∪{i})− v(S)] for all i ∈ N and all v ∈ GN ,
where s = |S|, defines a semivalue ψ; (b) conversely, every semivalue can be obtained
in this way; (c) the correspondence given by {pk}n−1k=0 7→ ψ is bijective.
Thus, the payoff that a semivalue allocates to every player in any game is a
weighted sum of his marginal contributions in the game. If pk is interpreted as the
probability that a given player i joins a coalition of size k, provided that all the coali-
tions of a common size have the same probability of being joined, then ψi[v] is the
expected marginal contribution of that player to a random coalition he joins.





, and the Banzhaf value β [13], for which pk = 21−n. The Shapley value
is the only efficient semivalue, in the sense that ∑
i∈N
ϕi[v] = v(N) for every v ∈ GN .
The multilinear extension [14] of a game v ∈ GN is the real–valued function de-







(1− x j)v(S), (1)
where XN denotes the set of variables xi for i ∈ N and 0≤ xi ≤ 1 for i = 1,2, . . . ,n.
2.2 Bicooperative Games and Bisemivalues
Let N be a finite set of players and 3N = {(S,T ) : S,T ⊆ N, S∩T = /0} be the set of
all ordered pairs of disjoint coalitions. Following [15], there is a relation in 3N given
by (A,B)v (C,D)⇔ A⊆C, B⊇ D.
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Following [1], a bicooperative game on N is a function b : 3N → R, that assigns
a real number b(S,T ) to each pair of coalitions (S, T ) ∈ 3N , with b( /0, /0) = 0. For
each (S,T ) ∈ 3N , the worth b(S,T ) represents the maximal gain (if b(S,T ) > 0) or
the minimal loss (if b(S,T )< 0) that is obtained, when players in S are in favor of a
change in the situation, players in T are against the change and players in N \ (S∪T )
are indifferent. Then, b( /0,N) is the cost obtained, when all players are against the
change and b(N, /0) is the maximal gain obtained, when all players want to change
the initial situation. We will denote by BGN the set of all bicooperative games on N.
A bicooperative game is monotonic if b(S,T ) ≤ b(S′,T ′), whenever (S,T ) v
(S′,T ′). A player i ∈ N is a dummy in b if b(S∪ {i},T ) = b(S,T ) + b({i}, /0) and
b(S,T ∪{i} = b(S,T )+ b( /0,{i}) for all (S,T ) ∈ 3N\{i}, and null in b if, moreover,
b({i}, /0) = b( /0,{i}) = 0.
Endowed with the natural operations for real–valued functions, the set of all bico-
operative games on N is a vector space BGN . For every (S,T )∈ 3N such that (S,T ) 6=
( /0, /0), the identity game δ(S,T ) is defined by δ(S,T )(A,B) = 1, if (A,B) = (S,T ) and
δ(S,T )(A,B) = 0, otherwise. It is easily checked that the set of all identity games is a
basis for BGN , so that dim(BGN) = 3n−1 if n = |N|.
By a value on BGN we will mean a map g : BGN → RN , that assigns to every
game b a vector g[b] with components gi[b] for all i ∈ N.
Bisemivalues for bicooperative games were defined and characterized in [6] as
follows.
Definition 2.1 (Domènech et al, 2018) A bisemivalue on BGN is a map ψ : BGN → RN
that satisfies:
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(i) linearity: ψ[αb+βb′] = αψ[b]+βψ[b′], for all b,b′ ∈ GBN and α, β ∈ R;
(ii) anonymity: ψπi[πb] = ψi[b] for all permutation π over N, i ∈ N, and b ∈ BGN ,
where πb(πS,πT ) = b(S,T ) and πS = {πi : i ∈ S};
(iii) positivity: if b is monotonic, then ψ[b]≥ 0;
(iv) dummy player property: if i ∈ N is a dummy in game b then, ψi[b] = b({i}, /0)−
b( /0,{i}).
Theorem 2.1 (Domènech et al, 2018) A value ψ on BGN is a bisemivalue if and
only if there exist two collections of real numbers ps,t and qs,t , s, t = 0, .1, ...,n− 1,
satisfying:





































[ps,t(b(S∪ i,T )−b(S,T ))+qs,t(b(S,T )−b(S,T ∪ i))] (3)
for all i ∈ N and all b ∈ BGN , where s = |S| and t = |T |.
In addition, a subfamily of bisemivalues, called (p,q)–bisemivalues, is intro-
duced. For each one of them, the weighting coefficients depend on two parame-
ters p, q ∈ [0,1]. These bisemivalues are suited for the study of bicooperative games
where players show two different tendencies to form coalitions. These tendencies are
defined for all players by parameters p and q.
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Definition 2.2 (Domènech et al, 2018) Let p, q∈ [0,1] with p+q≤ 1. The (p,q)–bi-
semivalue ψpq on BGN is defined by the coefficients ps,t = psqt(1− p− q)n−s−t−1
and qs,t = ptqs(1− p−q)n−s−t−1.
Moreover, a subfamily of (p,q)–bisemivalues, obtained when p = q, and called
binomial bisemivalues is also defined. They ”extend” the concept of binomial semi-
values, introduced in [16], to bicooperative games. Of course, p = q = 1/3 gives the
Banzhaf bisemivalue.
3 Regularity and Other Properties
In this section, we study for bisemivalues a series of standard properties considered in
the literature on value theory. Most of them hold for semivalues on cooperative games
but, as we will see, things are not so simple when we focus on bicooperative games
and use bisemivalues. Some of these properties only hold for a special subclass of
bisemivalues that we will call regular.
3.1 Dominance, Monotonicity and Sensitivity Properties
The first property concerns the desirability and indifference relations introduced in
[17] for cooperative games as follows. Let us considerer v ∈ GN and i, j ∈ N. We say
iD j in v iff v(S∪{i})≥ v(S∪{ j}) for all S⊆ N\{i, j}.
First of all, in the following definition we readapt this relation to bicooperative
games in order to get the same interpretation as in the cooperative case.
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Definition 3.1 Let us considerer b ∈ BGN and i, j ∈ N.
iD j in b iff

b(S∪{i},T )≥ b(S∪{ j},T ),
b(S,T ∪{i})≤ b(S,T ∪{ j}),
b(S∪{i},T ∪{ j})≥ b(S∪{ j},T ∪{i}),
for all (S,T ) ∈ 3N\{i, j}.
Relation D allows us to qualitatively compare the positions of two players in a given
game b.
Definition 3.2 Let us considerer b ∈ BGN and i, j ∈ N. iI j in b iff iD j and jDi in b.
Thus, iD j in b means that player i dominates (i.e., is “at least as desirable as”) j
as a coalition partner in b. Moreover, iI j in b means that players i, j are symmetric,
that is, indifferent (perfect substitutes of each other) as coalition partners. If iD j but
j 6Di in b then, we say that i dominates j strictly. It is not difficult to verify that I is an
equivalence relation (on N).
As it is shown in [18], g being a semivalue on GN , iD j in v implies gi[v]≥ g j[v],
and hence, iI j in v implies gi[v] = g j[v], although not always iD j and j 6Di together in
v imply gi[v]> g j[v]. What happens when bicooperative games and bisemivalues are
used?
Proposition 3.1 (Dominance property) Let i, j ∈ N be two distinct players and let ψ
be a bisemivalue on BGN . Then, for every game b ∈ BGN ,
(a) iD j implies ψi[b]≥ψ j[b] iff ps,t + ps+1,t ≥ qs+1,t and qs,t +qs,t+1 ≥ ps,t+1, for all
s, t = 0, ...,n−2.
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(b) iD j and j 6Di implies ψi[b] > ψ j[b] iff ps,t + ps+1,t > qs+1,t , ps,t+1 + qs+1,t > 0
and qs,t +qs,t+1 > ps,t+1, for all s, t = 0, ...,n−2.




ps,t [b(S∪ i,T )−b(S,T )]+qs,t [b(S,T )−b(S,T ∪ i)] =
∑
(S,T )∈3N\{i, j}
ps,t [b(S∪ i,T )−b(S,T )]+qs,t [b(S,T )−b(S,T ∪ i)]+
ps+1,t [b(S∪ j∪ i,T )−b(S∪ j,T )]+qs+1,t [b(S∪ j,T )−b(S∪ j,T ∪ i)]+
ps,t+1[b(S∪ i,T ∪ j)−b(S,T ∪ j)]+qs,t+1[b(S,T ∪ j)−b(S,T ∪ i∪ j)].
Now, by comparing this expression with the analogous expression for ψ j[b], it follows
that
ψi[b]−ψ j[b] = ∑
(S,T )∈3N\{i, j}
(ps,t + ps+1,t −qs+1,t)[b(S∪ i,T )−b(S∪ j,T )]+
(qs,t +qs,t+1− ps,t+1)[b(S,T ∪ j)−b(S,T ∪ i)]+
(ps,t+1 +qs+1,t)[b(S∪ i,T ∪ j)−b(S∪ j,T ∪ i)]≥ 0.
(⇒) (i) First, let us assume that pa,b + pa+1,b < qa+1,b, for some a,b = 0, ...,n− 2.
Pick i, j∈N and (A,B)∈ 3N\{i, j} such that |A|= a and |B|= b. Considerer the identity
game δ(A∪i,B). It is clear that iD j in this game however, ψi[δ(A∪i,B)]−ψ j[δ(A∪i,B)] =
pa,b + pa+1,b−qa+1,b < 0, a contradiction.
(ii) Now, we assume that qa,b +qa,b+1 < pa,b+1, for some a,b = 0, ...,n−2. Pick
i, j ∈ N and (A,B) ∈ 3N\{i, j} such that |A| = a and |B| = b. Considerer the identity
game δ(A,B∪ j). It is clear that iD j in this game however, ψi[δ(A,B∪ j)]−ψ j[δ(A,B∪ j)] =
qa,b +qa,b+1− pa,b+1 < 0, a contradiction.
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(b) (⇐) If iD j and j 6Di in b then, for some (S,T ) ∈ 3N\{i, j}, we have either
b(S∪{i},T )> b(S∪{ j},T ) or b(S,T ∪{i})< b(S,T ∪{ j}) or
b(S∪{i},T ∪{ j})> b(S∪{ j},T ∪{i}).
As ps,t + ps+1,t > qs+1,t , ps,t+1 + qs+1,t > 0 and qs,t + qs,t+1 > ps,t+1 for all s, t =
0, ...,n−2, it follows from the proof of (a) that ψi[b]> ψ j[b].
(⇒) (i) First, let us assume that pa,b+ pa+1,b ≤ qa+1,b, for some a,b= 0, ...,n−2.
Pick i, j∈N and (A,B)∈ 3N\{i, j} such that |A|= a and |B|= b. Considerer the identity
game δ(A∪i,B).
It is clear that iD j and j 6Di in this game. However, ψi[δ(A∪i,B)]−ψ j[δ(A∪i,B)] =
pa,b + pa+1,b−qa+1,b ≤ 0, a contradiction.
(ii) Now, we assume that qa,b +qa,b+1 ≤ pa,b+1, for some a,b = 0, ...,n−2. Pick
i, j ∈ N and (A,B) ∈ 3N\{i, j} such that |A| = a and |B| = b. Considerer the identity
game δ(A,B∪ j).
It is clear that iD j and j 6Di in this game. However, ψi[δ(A,B∪ j)]−ψ j[δ(A,B∪ j)] =
qa,b +qa,b+1− pa,b+1 ≤ 0, a contradiction.
(iii) Finally, we assume that pa,b+1 +qa+1,b = 0, for some a,b = 0, ...,n−2. Pick
i, j ∈ N and (A,B) ∈ 3N\{i, j} such that |A| = a and |B| = b. Considerer the identity
game δ(A∪i,B∪ j).
Clearly, iD j and j 6Di in this game however, ψi[δ(A∪i,B∪ j))]−ψ j[δ(A∪i,B∪ j))] =
pa,b+1 +qa+1,b = 0, a contradiction. ut
Remark 3.1 The Shapley and Banzhaf values satisfy the dominance property and the
family of (p,q)–bisemivalues satisfies dominance property (a).
Now, we introduce regular bisemivalues.
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Definition 3.3 A bisemivalue ψ on BGN is regular iff ps,t > 0 and qs,t > 0 for all
s, t = 0, ...,n−1.
Remark 3.2 (i) The Shapley and the Banzhaf values on bicooperative games are reg-
ular bisemivalues. (ii) A (p,q)–bisemivalue ψpq on BGN is regular iff p > 0, q > 0,
and p+q < 1. (iii) It is easy to see that the regular (p,q)–bisemivalues satisfy domi-
nance property (b).
Proposition 3.2 (Indifference property) Let i, j ∈ N be two distinct players and let ψ
be a bisemivalue on BGN . Then, for every game b ∈ BGN , iI j implies ψi[b] = ψ j[b].
Proof Analogously to Proposition 3.1 (a), if iI j we have
ψi[b]−ψ j[b] = ∑
(S,T )∈3N\i, j
[(ps,t + ps+1,t −qs+1,t)(b(S∪ i,T )−b(S∪ j,T ))+
(qs,t +qs,t+1− ps,t+1)(b(S,T ∪ j)−b(S,T ∪ i))+
(ps,t+1 +qs+1,t)(b(S∪ i,T ∪ j)−b(S∪ j,T ∪ i))] = 0. ut
From now on, we will focus on the monotonicity conditions considered in [19]
for cooperative games when providing an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley
value without using additivity, and extended to semivalues in [18]. Following this
work, in the next definition we introduce the monotonicity condition in a similar way
as the cooperative case.
Definition 3.4 Let b1,b2 ∈ BGN and i ∈ N. We say
b1Bb2 for i iff

b1(S∪{i},T )−b1(S,T )≥ b2(S∪{i},T )−b2(S,T ),
b1(S,T )−b1(S,T ∪{i})≥ b2(S,T )−b2(S,T ∪{i}).
for all (S,T ) ∈ 3N\{i}.
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That is, b1Bb2 iff i’s marginal contributions are better (not smaller) in b1 than in b2.
Relation B allows us to qualitatively compare the positions of a given player i in two
games.
Definition 3.5 (a) A value g on BGN satisfies the monotonicity property iff b1 Bb2
for i, implies gi[b1] ≥ gi[b2]. (b) A value g on BGN satisfies the sensitivity property
iff b1 Bb2 and b2 6Bb1 together for i, imply gi[b1]> gi[b2].
Proposition 3.3 (Monotonicity and sensitivity properties) Let ψ be a bisemivalue on
BGN and b1,b2 ∈ BGN be distinct games. Then, for each i ∈ N:
(a) ψ satisfies the monotonicity property.
(b) b1 Bb2 and b2 Bb1 for i, implies ψi[b1] = ψi[b2].
(c) ψ satisfies the sensitivity property iff ψ is regular.
Proof (a) By a mere inspection of
ψi[b1] = ∑
(S,T )∈3N\i
[ps,t(b1(S∪ i,T )−b1(S,T ))+qs,t(b1(S,T )−b1(S,T ∪ i))]
ψi[b2] = ∑
(S,T )∈3N\i
[ps,t(b2(S∪ i,T )−b2(S,T ))+qs,t(b2(S,T )−b2(S,T ∪ i))] ,
it follows that ψi[b1]≥ ψ2[b1], because
b1(S∪{i},T )−b1(S,T )≥ b2(S∪{i},T )−b2(S,T ),
b1(S,T )−b1(S,T ∪{i})≥ b2(S,T )−b2(S,T ∪{i})
and ps,t ≥ 0, qs,t ≥ 0, for all (S,T ) ∈ 3N\{i}.
(b) It suffices to apply (a) twice.
(c) (⇐) If b1 Bb2 and b2 6Bb1 for i, then we have either
b1(S∪{i},T )−b1(S,T )> b2(S∪{i},T )−b2(S,T ) or
b1(S,T )−b1(S,T ∪{i})> b2(S,T )−b2(S,T ∪{i}),
14 Margarita Domènech et al.
for some (S,T )∈ 3N\{i}. If ψ is regular, ψi[b1]> ψi[b2] follows from the proof of (a).
(⇒) If n = 1, the statement holds trivially because any bisemivalue is regular.
If n ≥ 2, let us assume that ψ is not regular. Then, there is either some ps,t = 0 or
qs,t = 0.
(i) Let us first assume that pa,b = 0, for some a,b = 0, ...,n− 1. Pick i ∈ N and




b1. Then, b1 Bb2 and b2 6Bb1 but, ψi[b1] = pa,b = 0 = 12 pa,b = ψi[b2],
a contradiction.
(ii) Now, we assume that qa,b = 0, for some a,b = 0, ...,n−1. Pick i∈N and (A,B)∈
3N\{i} such that |A| = a and |B| = b. Taking b1 = δ(A,B∪i) and b2 = 2b1, again it
is clear that b1 Bb2 and b2 6Bb1 for i but, ψi[b1] =−qa,b = 0 =−2qa,b = ψi[b2], a
contradiction. ut
3.2 Nonnull Player, Null Player Exclusion and Balanced Contributions
Properties
The first property of this section refers to nonnull players. Usually, if g is a value on
BGN , a nonnull player i ∈ N in a monotonic game v gets a payoff gi[v] > 0. This
property holds for —and in fact characterizes – all regular bisemivalues within the
class of bisemivalues.
Proposition 3.4 (Nonnull player property) A bisemivalue on BGN ψ allocates a pos-
itive payoff to every nonnull player in any monotonic game b ∈ BGN if and only if ψ
is regular.
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Proof (⇐) Assume that ψ is regular and let i ∈ N be a nonnull player in a mono-
tonic game b ∈ BGN . Then, by monotonicity, b(S∪ i,T )−b(S,T )≥ 0 and b(S,T )−
b(S,T ∪ i)≥ 0 for all (S,T ) ∈ 3N\{i} and, either b(S∪ i,T )−b(S,T )> 0 or b(S,T )−
b(S,T ∪ i)> 0, for some (S,T )∈ 3N\{i}, since i is nonnull. Moreover, from regularity,
it follows that ps,t > 0 and qs,t > 0, for all s, t = 0, ...,n−1. Hence,
ψi[b] = ∑
(S,T )∈3N\i
[ps,t(b(S∪ i,T )−b(S,T ))+qs,t(b(S,T )−b(S,T ∪ i))]> 0.
(⇒) If n = 1, b is monotonic and i is no null, the statement holds trivially.
Now, consider n≥ 2 and assume that ψ is not regular. Then, there is either some
ps,t = 0 or qs,t = 0.
(i) If pa,b = 0 for some a,b = 0, ...,n− 1. Pick i ∈ N and (A,B) ∈ 3N\{i} such that
|A|= a and |B|= b. Considerer the game
b(S,T ) =

1, i f (S,T )w (A∪{k},B) for any k ∈ N \ (A∪B),
0, otherwise.
Then, b is monotonic and i is a nonnull player in b. However, ψi[b] = pa,b = 0.
(ii) If qa,b = 0, for some a,b = 0, ...,n− 1. Pick i ∈ N and (A,B) ∈ 3N\{i} such that
|A|= a and |B|= b. Take the game
b(S,T ) =

−1, i f (S,T )v (A,B∪{k}) for any k ∈ N \ (A∪B),
0, otherwise.
Then, b is monotonic and i is a nonnull player in b. However, ψi[b] = qa,b = 0.ut
Before studying the following properties, we need the notion of subgame with
regard to a nonempty R⊆ N. If b ∈ BGN , the game b|R ∈ GR, defined by b|R(S,T ) =
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b(S,T ), for all (S,T )⊆ 3R, is a subgame of b. In the particular case where, T =N\{i}
for some i ∈ N, we will prefer to write b−{i} instead of bN\{i}.
Following [6], analogously to the cooperative case, bisemivalues are also defined
on cardinalities rather than on specific player set: that is, two weighting vectors ps,t
and qs,t define a bisemivalue ψ on all N such that n = |N|. When necessary, we shall
write ψ(n) for a bisemivalue on cardinality n, pns,t and q
n
s,t for its weighting coeffi-
cients. A bisemivalue ψ(n) induces bisemivalues ψ(t) for all cardinalities t < n, recur-
















for 0≤ s, t < m≤ n.
We will say that ψ(n−1),ψ(n−2), ...,ψ(1) are the bisemivalues induced by ψ(n).
The following property, introduced for cooperative games in [20], refers to the
effect of a null player leaving the game. It is desirable that the payoffs given by a
value to the remaining players are not affected by this exclusion. As we will see, this
property holds for any bisemivalue.
Definition 3.6 A value g on BGN satisfies the null player exclusion property if for
all b ∈ BGN g j[b] = g j[b−{i}], for all i, j ∈ N such that i is a null player in b.
Proposition 3.5 (Null player exclusion property) Every bisemivalue ψ(n) on BGN
satisfies the null player exclusion property.
Some Properties for Bisemivalues on Bicooperative Games 17
Proof Following the initial argument of the proof of Proposition 3.1, we obtain
ψ
(n)
j [b] = ∑
(S,T )∈3N\{ j}
p(n)s,t [b(S∪ j,T )−b(S,T )]+q
(n)
s,t [b(S,T )−b(S,T ∪ j)] =
∑
(S,T )∈3N\{i, j}
p(n)s,t [b(S∪ j,T )−b(S,T )]+q
(n)
s,t [b(S,T )−b(S,T ∪ j)]+
p(n)s+1,t [b(S∪ i∪ j,T )−b(S∪ i,T )]+q
(n)
s+1,t [b(S∪ i,T )−b(S∪ i,T ∪ j)]+
p(n)s,t+1[b(S∪ j,T ∪ i)−b(S,T ∪ i)]+q
(n)
s,t+1[b(S,T ∪ i)−b(S,T ∪ j∪ i)].
As i is a null player in b, we can deduce that b(S∪ i,T ) = b(S,T ∪ i) = b(S,T ),
b(S∪ i∪ j,T ) = b(S∪ j,T ), b(S,T ∪ i∪ j) = b(S,T ∪ j), b(S∪ j,T ∪ i) = b(S∪ j,T )















s,t+1)[b(S,T )−b(S,T ∪ j)]
= ∑
(S,T )∈3N\{i, j}
p(n−1)s,t [b−{i}](S∪ j,T )−b−{i}](S,T )]+




The following property, originally introduced in [21] for cooperative games, refers
to the effect of excluding a player on the payoff to any other player.
Definition 3.7 A value g on BGN satisfies the property of balanced contributions if
for all b ∈ BGN and all i, j ∈ N, gi[b]−gi[b−{ j}] = g j[b]−g j[b−{i}].
In the above equation, the left−hand side represents j′s contributions to i′s payoff,
while the right−hand side represents j′s contributions to i′s payoff. This property
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states that these contributions are balanced between any two players. In the next
proposition, we characterize the class of solutions satisfying the balanced contribu-
tions property within the class of bisemivalues.
Proposition 3.6 (Balanced contributions property) Let ψ(n) be a bisemivalue on BGN .
Then,
ψ(n) satisfies the balanced contributions property iff pns, t+1 + q
n
s+1, t = 0, for all
s, t = 0, .1, ...,n−2.
Proof (⇐) Let ψ(n) be a bisemivalue on cardinality n. Starting at Eq. (3) and using





i [b−{ j}] =
∑
(S,T )∈3N\i, j
pns+1,t [b(S∪ j∪ i,T )−b(S∪ j,T )−b(S∪ i,T )+b(S,T )]+
qns+1,t [b(S∪ j,T )−b(S∪ j,T ∪ i)−b(S,T )+b(S,T ∪ i)]+
pns,t+1[b(S∪ i,T ∪ j)−b(S,T ∪ j)−b(S∪ i,T )+b(S,T )]+
qns,t+1[b(S,T ∪ j)−b(S,T ∪ i∪ j)−b(S,T )+b(S,T ∪ i)]].
Now, by comparing it with the analogous expression for ψ(n)j [b]−ψ
(n−1)
j [b−{i}] and
taking into account that pns, t+1 = q
n
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(⇒) Assume that pna,b+1 + qna+1,b 6= 0, for some a,b = 0, ...,n− 2. Pick i, j ∈ N
and (A,B) ∈ 3N\{i, j} such that |A|= a and |B|= b.









j [δ(A∪i,B∪ j)−{i}]] =
pna,b+1 +q
n
a+1,b 6= 0, a contradiction. ut
3.3 Block Property
To study the following property we need to define formally what is meant by two
players, i and j in a bicooperative game forming a block and operating as a single
player. Clearly, this gives rise to a new bicooperative game whose set of players is
obtained from the initial set of players by removing both i and j and introducing a
new player representing the block. From now on, we will denote this new player by
i& j and bi& j the corresponding bicooperative game.
Definition 3.8 Let b ∈ BGN and let i and j be two distinct players in N. Taking i& j
to be a new entity, not belonging to N, the game bi& j played in N′ =N \{i, j}∪{i& j}
is defined by
bi& j(S,T ) =

b(S\{i& j}∪{i}∪{ j},T ), if i& j ∈ S,
b(S,T \{i& j}∪{i}∪{ j}), if i& j ∈ T,
b(S,T ), otherwise.
Definition 3.9 A value g on BGN satisfies the block property if for every monotonic
game b ∈ BGN and for all i, j ∈ N such that j is not a null player then, gi& j[bi& j] >
gi[b].
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Proposition 3.7 (Block property ) Let ψ(n) be a bisemivalue on BGN . Then, ψ(n) sat-
isfies the block property iff pns+1, t−qns+1, t > 0, qns, t+1− pns, t+1 > 0, pns, t + pns, t+1 > 0
and qns, t +q
n
s+1, t > 0, for all s, t = 0, .1, ...,n−2.
Proof (⇐) Let ψ(n) be a bisemivalue on cardinality n. Starting at Eq. (3) and using
Eq. (4), after some calculus, we have
ψ
(n−1)
i& j [bi& j]−ψ
(n)
i [b] = ∑
(S,T )∈3N\{i, j}
pns,t [b(S∪ i∪ j,T )−b(S∪ i,T )]+
(pns+1,t −qns+1,t)[b(S∪ j,T )−b(S,T )]+qns+1,t [b(S∪ j,T ∪ i)−b(S,T ∪ i∪ j)]+
(qns,t+1− pns,t+1)[b(S,T )−b(S,T ∪ j)]+ pns,t+1[b(S∪ i∪ j,T )−
b(S∪ i,T ∪ j)]+qns,t [b(S,T ∪ i)−b(S,T ∪ i∪ j)]
By monotonicity,
b(S∪ i∪ j,T )−b(S∪ i,T )≥ 0, b(S∪ j,T )−b(S,T )≥ 0,
b(S∪ j,T ∪ i)−b(S,T ∪ i∪ j)≥ 0, b(S,T )−b(S,T ∪ j)≥ 0,
b(S∪ i∪ j,T )−b(S∪ i,T ∪ j)≥ 0 and b(S,T ∪ i)−b(S,T ∪ i∪ j)≥ 0,
for all (S,T ) ∈ 3N\{i, j} and either
(i) b(S∪ i∪ j,T )−b(S∪ i,T )> 0 or (ii) b(S∪ j,T )−b(S,T )> 0 or
(iii) b(S,T )−b(S,T ∪ j)> 0 or (iv) b(S,T ∪ i)−b(S,T ∪ i∪ j)> 0,
for some (S,T ) ∈ 3N\{i, j}, since j is nonnull.
If (i), by monotonicity, b(S∪ i∪ j,T )− b(S∪ i,T ∪ j) > 0 and if ps, t = 0 then,
ps, t+1 > 0.
If either (ii) or (iii), the property holds taking into account that pns+1, t−qns+1, t > 0
and qns, t+1− pns, t+1 > 0.
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If (iv), by monotonicity, b(S∪ j,T ∪ i)− b(S,T ∪ i∪ j) > 0 and if qs, t = 0 then,
qs+1, t > 0. In all cases we get ψ
(n−1)




(i) Assume that pna+1,b− qna+1,b ≤ 0, for some a,b = 0, ...,n− 2. Pick i, j ∈ N and
(A,B) ∈ 3N\{i, j} such that |A|= a and |B|= b.
We considerer the game
b(S,T ) =

1, if either (S,T )w (A∪{k},B) or (S,T )w (A∪{k},B∪{ j})
for any k ∈ N \ (A∪B),
0, otherwise.
b is monotonic and j is a nonnull player in b.
However, ψ(n−1)i& j [bi& j]−ψ
(n)
i [b] = p
n
a+1,b−qna+1,b ≤ 0, a contradiction.
(ii) Assume that qna,b+1− pna,b+1 ≤ 0, for some a,b = 0, ...,n− 2. Pick i, j ∈ N and
(A,B) ∈ 3N\{i, j} such that |A|= a and |B|= b. We consider the game
b(S,T ) =

1, if either (S,T )w (A,B) or (S,T )w (A∪{i},B∪{ j}),
0, otherwise.
b is monotonic and j is a nonnull player in b.
However, ψ(n−1)i& j [bi& j]−ψ
(n)
i [b] = q
n
a,b+1− pna,b+1 ≤ 0, a contradiction.
(iii) Assume that pna,b + p
n
a,b+1 = 0, for some a,b = 0, ...,n− 2. Pick i, j ∈ N and
(A,B) ∈ 3N\{i, j} such that |A|= a and |B|= b. We consider the game
b(S,T ) =

1, if(S,T )w (A∪{k}∪{l},B) for any k, l ∈ N \ (A∪B),
0, otherwise.
b is monotonic and j is a nonnull player in b.
However, ψ(n−1)i& j [bi& j]−ψ
(n)




a,b+1 = 0, a contradiction.
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(iv) Assume that qna,b + q
n
a+1,b = 0, for some a,b = 0, ...,n− 2. Pick i, j ∈ N and
(A,B) ∈ 3N\{i, j} such that |A|= a and |B|= b. We considerer the game
b(S,T ) =

1, if(S,T )w (A,B∪{k}) for any k ∈ N \ (A∪B),
0, otherwise.
b is monotonic and j is a nonnull player in b.
However, ψ(n−1)i& j [bi& j]−ψ
(n)




a+1,b = 0, a contradiction. ut
Notice that the block i& j can be regarded as a result of a voluntary merger be-
tween players i and j. But it can also be regarded as a result of a takeover, in which i,
having annexed j′s player rights, now trades under the new name i& j. The assump-
tion that player i must gain power by absorbing in this way player j, who is not a
null player, seems to be intuitively compelling. A voluntary merger will take place
only if a result of it, both parties are at least as well as they were before. A takeover,
however, need not be beneficial to both parties, but only to the one instigating it.
4 A Computational Procedure to Calculate Bisemivalues
As it is well known, both the Shapley and Banzhaf values of any cooperative game
v can be easily obtained from its multilinear extension [13,14]. This latter procedure
extends well to any p–binomial semivalue (see, e.g., [22,23]). Also, in [9], semivalues
on cooperative games are computed by means of the MLE of the game.
Following this idea, the multilinear extension of a bicooperative game is intro-
duced in [6] in a similar way as in the cooperative case [14] and it allows us to
compute (p,q)– bisemivalues in general, and the Banzhaf bisemivalue in particular.
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In this section, we go further and present a method to compute any bisemivalue
by means of the multilinear extension of the game.
Following [6], each (S,T ) ∈ 3N is identified by a vector (X ,Y ) of R2n such that
X = (x1, . . . ,xn), Y = (y1, . . . ,yn), and
xi =





1, if i ∈ T,
0, otherwise.
For instance, if N = {1,2,3} the coalitions ({1,3},{2}) and ({1,2}, /0) are iden-
tified by (X ,Y ) = (1,0,1,0,1,0) and (X ,Y ) = (1,1,0,0,0,0), respectively.
Definition 4.1 (Domènech et al, 2018) The multilinear extension of a game b∈BGN
is the real-valued function defined on R2n by












Lemma 4.1 Let (A,B) ∈ 3N such that (A,B) 6= ( /0, /0). Then, the MLE of the identity
game δ(A,B) is







Lemma 4.2 Let ψ be a bisemivalue on BGN . The allocations to a player i∈N in the
identity game δ(A,B) are given by
ψi[δ(A,B)] =

pa−1,b, if i ∈ A,
−qa,b−1, if i ∈ B,
qa,b− pa,b, if i ∈ N \ (A∪B).
Proof It easily follows by applying the definition of bisemivalue given in Theorem
2.1 to the identity game δ(A,B). ut
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In the next theorem, we present a method to compute any bisemivalue by means
of the multilinear extension of the game.
Theorem 4.1 Let b ∈ BGN and ψ be a bisemivalue on BGN with weighting coeffi-
cients ps,t and qs,t , s, t = 0,1, ...,n− 1. Then, the following steps lead to the bisemi-
value value of any player i ∈ N.
1. Obtain the multilinear extension f (X ,Y ) of game b.









by ps−1,t if i ∈ S; by −qs,t−1 if i ∈ T and by (qs,t − ps,t) if i ∈ N \ (S∪T ).
3. Avaluate f i at point (1S,1T ), where
1S =

1, if j ∈ S,
0, if j ∈ N \ (S∪T ).
and 1T =

1, if j ∈ T,
0, if j ∈ N \ (S∪T ),
for each j ∈ N and ψi[b] = f i(1S,1T ),
Proof Step 1 shows the multilinear extension of b as a linear combination of multi-
linear extensions of identity games. Step 2 weights each identity game according to
Lemma 4.2 in order to obtain ψi[b] in step 3. ut
5 An Example
In this section, we present an example of bicooperative game (for more specific ex-
amples about bicooperative games, we refer the reader to [6,24]). The allocations
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obtained by the players will be analyzed by using bisemivalues and we will compute
them by using the MLE technique given in Theorem 4.1.
The Navigator company has 3 investors. The investments of each one of them are
2, 4 and 6 million euros respectively. The company is studying a new project where,
for every million invested, 1.5 million will be received. Now, Navigator company
needs to know investors’ intentions of investing in this project. If N = {1,2,3} is the
set of investors, we can define the bicooperative game b(S,T ) as the company profit
when players in S agree to invest their investment in the project and players in T do
not agree to the project and remove their investment to the company. Finally, absten-
tion means that the investor does not invest in the project, but does not withdraw his
investment in the company. In this situation, b is the bicooperative game defined by
b({1,2,3}, /0) = 6, b( /0, /0) = 0, b( /0,{1,2,3}) =−12, b( /0,{1}) =−2,
b({1,3}, /0) = 4, b({2,3}, /0) = 5, b({1,2}, /0) = 3, b( /0,{2}) =−4,
b({1,3},{2}) = 0, b({2,3},{1}) = 3, b({1,2},{3}) =−3, b( /0,{3}) =−6,
b({3}, /0) = 3, b({2}, /0) = 2, b({1}, /0) = 1, b( /0,{2,3}) =−10,
b({3},{1}) = 1, b({3},{2}) =−1, b({2},{1}) = 0, b( /0,{1,3}) =−8,
b({2},{3}) =−4, b({1},{2}) =−3, b({1},{3}) =−5, b( /0,{1,2}) =−6,
b({3},{1,2}) =−3, b({2},{1,3}) =−6, b({1},{2,3}) =−9.
From Definition 4.1 the MLE of b is
f (X ,Y ) =6x1x2x3 +4x1x3(1− x2− y2)+3x3(1− x1− y1)(1− x2− y2)+ x3y1(1− x2− y2)−
4x2y3(1− x1− y1)−3x3y1y2−2y1(1− x2− y2)(1− x3− y3)−10y2y3(1− x1− y1)+
5x2x3(1− x1− y1)+3x2x3y1 +2x2(1− x1− y1)(1− x3− y3)− x3y2(1− x1− y1)−
3x1y2(1− x3− y3)−6x2y1y3−4y2(1− x1− y1)(1− x3− y3)−8y1y3(1− x2− y2)−
12y1y2y3 +3x1x2(1− x3− y3)−3x1x2y3 + x1(1− x2− y2)(1− x3− y3)−
5x1y3(1− x2− y2)−9x1y2y3−6y3(1− x1− y1)(1− x2− y2)−6y1y2(1− x3− y3)
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We will compute ψ[b], where ψ is a bisemivalue on BGN with weighting coefficients
ps,t and qs,t , s, t = 0,1,2, by using the computational method given in Section 4. Step
2 in Theorem 4.1 gives a new MLE f i, for each i = 1,2,3. For player 1,
f 1(X ,Y ) =6p2,0x1x2x3 +4p1,0x1x3(1− x2− y2)+3(q1,0− p1,0)x3(1− x1− y1)(1− x2− y2)−
q1,0x3y1(1− x2− y2)−4(q1,1− p1,1)x2y3(1− x1− y1)+3q1,1x3y1y2+
2q0,0y1(1− x2− y2)(1− x3− y3)−10(q0,2− p0,2)y2y3(1− x1− y1)+
5(q2,0− p2,0)x2x3(1− x1− y1)−3q2,0x2x3y1 +2(q1,0− p1,0)x2(1− x1− y1)(1− x3− y3)−
(q1,1− p1,1)x3y2(1− x1− y1)−3p0,1x1y2(1− x3− y3)+6q1,1x2y1y3−
4(q0,1− p0,1)y2(1− x1− y1)(1− x3− y3)+8q0,1y1y3(1− x2− y2)+12q0,2y1y2y3+
3p1,0x1x2(1− x3− y3)−3p1,1x1x2y3 + p0,0x1(1− x2− y2)(1− x3− y3)−5p0,1x1y3(1− x2− y2)−
9p0,2x1y2y3−6(q0,1− p0,1)y3(1− x1− y1)(1− x2− y2)+6q0,1y1y2(1− x3− y3)
Step 3 yields
ψ1[b] = p0,0 +2p1,0 +2p0,1 + p2,0 +2p1,1 + p0,2 +2q0,0 +4q1,0 +4q0,1 +2q2,0 +4q1,1 +2q0,2
Analogously, for players 2 and 3:
ψ2[b] = 2p0,0 +4p1,0 +4p0,1 +2p2,0 +4p1,1 +2p0,2 +4q0,0 +8q1,0 +8q0,1 +4q2,0 +8q1,1 +4q0,2,
ψ3[b] = 3p0,0 +6p1,0 +6p0,1 +3p2,0 +6p1,1 +3p0,2 +6q0,0 +12q1,0 +12q0,1 +6q2,0 +12q1,1 +6q0,2.
Particularly, for Shapley bisemivalue ϕ, whose weighting coefficients are
ps,t =
(3+ s− t)!(3+ t− s−1)!
6!
23−s−t and qs,t =
(3+ t− s)!(3+ s− t−1)!
6!
23−s−t ,
for s = 0,1,2, we get: ϕ1[b] = 3, ϕ2[b] = 6, ϕ3[b] = 9.
Notice that ∑
i∈N
ϕi[b] = b(N, /0)−b( /0,N) = 18.
6 Conclusions
We investigate the conditions for the coefficients of the bisemivalues necessary and /
or sufficient in order to satisfy some properties. Most of these properties were studied
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in the context of cooperative games: in [5], for several power indices; in [18], for
semivalues; in [7], for semiindices (semivalues for simple games) and in [8], for
probabilistic values in general and multinomial (probabilistic) values in particular.
The study of properties is a useful tool to know better the available solutions for a
model. We can use it in order to identify the most appropiate solution for a particular
problem by choosing that one whose supporting properties are more adequate for
the problem. In this work, we also characterize different families of bisemivalues by
means of algebraic expressions of the coefficients: (i) the class of bisemivalues that
satisfies the dominance property; (ii) the regular bisemivalues, as those that satisfy
the sensitive property, (iii) the regular bisemivalues, as those that allocate positive
payoffs to every nonnull player in a monotonic game, (iv) the class of bisemivalues
that satisfies the property of balanced contributions and (v) the class of bisemivalues
satisfying the block property.
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